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The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was strongly criticized by 
scholars from all spectrums of the society for its perceived 
failure to hold the child offender accountable. Therefore, 
emphasis was laid on increasing the quantum of 
punishment, in order to act as an effective deterrent. In 
the backdrop of the Nirbhaya case, the Parliament of 
India rushed to enact the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 as a 
fire-fighting measure, to mollify the public clamour. As 
per the new Act, children aged between sixteen to 
eighteen can be transferred to an adult criminal court, in 
the event they are alleged to have committed a heinous 
offence. The paper aims to analyze the framework of 
Section 15 of the Act, in the context of a juvenile's 
physiology. An attempt has also been made to study how 
other nations around the world are addressing the 
problem of juvenile delinquency. The paper concludes by 
highlighting the ambiguity in the legislation and suggests 
solutions for doing away with the same.  
Keywords: Criminal recidivism, juvenile delinquency, Section 15 of 
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, social defense, United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1992 
1. Introduction 
At the outset, it is pertinent to clarify what the author means by 
Juvenile Justice system (hereinafter referred to as JJS) for the 
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purpose of the paper. The paper deals only with that aspect of 
juvenile justice which includes criminal conduct. The author 
excludes from consideration the other facets of the act, i.e. care, 
protection, adoption and neglect. The author has used the term 
juvenile, adolescent and children interchangeably as these terms do 
overlap. It is also germane to explain the nature of juvenile 
delinquency beforehand. Juveniles are generally accepted to be 
different from, and are treated differently, unlike adults, both in the 
legal and social contexts, on the basis of their age.1 In generic terms, 
juvenile delinquency has been defined as deviant child behavior. 
When a young person is involved in a criminal act, he is referred to 
as a juvenile delinquent, juvenile offender or a youthful offender, 
and the crime, as juvenile delinquency.2 
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015 
(hereinafter JJ Act, 2015), as passed by Parliament, received the 
assent of the President of India, on December 13, 2015 and is 
applicable to the whole of India, except the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The gruesome rape in the Nirbhaya case, where one of the 
offenders was 17 years old, just 3 months short from attaining 
majority, fueled the concern that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was 
ill-equipped to deal with this new breed of delinquents, the so-
called juvenile superpredators.3 The policy elites, the media, as well 
as ordinary citizens, from all spectrums resorted to questioning  the 
legitimacy of the juvenile legislation and the need for the adoption 
of stringent punishment, to act as a deterrent. The Parliament, 
under unprecedented scrutiny and criticism for its perceived 
inability to respond to the Juvenile menace, succumbed to the 
demand of some critics riding on the myth of superpredators.4 
Thus, the Parliament brought in the JJ Act, 2015 to make it easier to 
prosecute juveniles as adults. Under the existing framework, a 
                                                          
1 Adolescent Development & Competency, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEG., 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-adolescent.pdf. 
2 SIMA NIEBORG ET AL., VERWEY-JONKER INSTITUUT, CHILD AND JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY: STRATEGIES OF PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION IN 
GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS 20 (2000). 
3 Addie C. Rolnick, Untangling The Web: Juvenile Justice In Indian Country, 
19(49) N.Y.U JOUR. OF LEG. & PUB. POLICY 49, 101-02 (2016). 
4 Id. 
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child between the age of 16-18 years, alleged to have committed a 
heinous offence, may be transferred to an adult criminal court, 
known as children's court, to be tried as an adult.5 Section 15 of the 
JJ Act, 2015 is the most contentious provision, mandating the 
Juvenile Justice Board (hereinafter referred to as JJB) to transfer 
cases involving a child between 16-18 years, alleged to have 
committed a heinous offence, to a children's court. This decision is 
to be made by the Board on the basis of a preliminary assessment 
conducted to examine the child's capacity to commit such an 
offence. This Section casts an onerous obligation on the JJB to take 
the assistance of psycho-social workers, psychologists and other 
experts, in order to come to a conclusion regarding the mental 
capacity of the said accused. If the Board is satisfied in its 
preliminary assessment, then it may transfer the child to be dealt 
by the Children's Court, under Section 18(3).6 The author submits 
that the provision requiring preliminary assessment of the child is a 
subjective process, creating scope for enormous arbitrariness. The 
legislature has failed to take into account modern scientific 
evidences which unequivocally show that individual assessment of 
a child's mental capacity is not possible. Although the JJ Act, 2015, 
was passed after the implementation of several international legal 
instruments on children's rights, it does not align with the 
international mandates set. The transferring of a child into the adult 
criminal justice system, as envisaged by the JJ Act, 2015 is also in 
violation of Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution of India. 
The first half of this paper summarizes the historical context of 
Juvenile justice legislation in India. The next, reviews the 
international mandate set by the international legal instruments, 
which India fails to conform to. The author also analyses the 
framework of Section 15 and the plausibility of assessing a child's 
mental capacity vis-à-vis criminal culpability. The paper also 
examines the JJ Act, 2015 with respect to the fundamental rights of 
the Indian Constitution. The author has also carried out a 
comparative examination of the juvenile justice system prevalent 
worldwide, for a better understanding of this system. Reference has 
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been made particularly to Uganda, South Africa and France, 
known for enacting progressive laws in relation to juvenile 
delinquency. The author concludes by proposing solutions to 
remove the ambiguity inherent in the legislation. 
2. The History of Juvenile Delinquency 
Understanding the existing state of JJS in India requires recourse to 
history. The paradigm shift in the conception of children during the 
industrial revolution, led to the emergence of a separate juvenile 
justice system in the western countries.7 In India, the JJS originated 
during the British rule in India. The reform movements taking 
place in the United Kingdom influenced India heavily. However, 
the changes introduced in India, in order to deal with juvenile 
delinquency were not limited only to those measures adopted in 
the United Kingdom.8  The subsequent legislation in India, 
spearheaded the jurisprudence of criminal law and its procedural 
safeguards. The Indian courts took after the  American juvenile 
courts in adopting a parens patriae model in relation to matters of 
youth delinquency.9 Juvenile courts assumed a paternalistic 
attitude pursuing the doctrine of parens patriae, emphasized 
supervision, treatment, and control towards juvenile 
delinquents.10Consequently, the treatment of juvenile offenders 
was different in nature.11For some time, juvenile courts lent 
themselves to procedural informalities, owing to which the 
juveniles were not accorded the same procedural safeguards as 
their adult counterparts.12 This cavalier approach to the rights of 
the delinquents, led to due process concerns, and by the 1960s, a 
series of U.S Supreme Court decisions recognized due process 
                                                          
7 Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth 
Violence, Crime and Justice, 24 UNI. OF CHICAGO PRESS 189-261 (1998). 
8 Ved Kumari, The Juvenile Justice System in India from Welfare to Rights, 
Oxford India Paperbacks, (2003).  
9   Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Wharton 9 (Pa. 1839). 
10  Julian William Mack, The Juvenile Court, 24 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). 
11  A. Morris and H. Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice, 8 Nat. Cri. Justice 
Reference Service (1987)  
12 Howard W. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, National Ctr. for Juvenile 
Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: National Report 88-89 (1999) 
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rights in juvenile proceedings. For instance, the Supreme Court in 
In re Gault engrafted formal procedures onto juvenile courts. It 
observed that “the absence of substantive standards has not 
necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, 
individualized treatment. Departures from established principles of 
due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, 
but in arbitrariness".13Gradually, the 'welfare' approach (parens 
patriae) shifted to a 'rights' based approach, which complies with 
the Constitutional and procedural rights enshrined in the 
Constitution14 
From early 20th century onwards, each state in India had its own 
Act, dealing with the issue of juvenile delinquency. The Madras 
Presidency, an administrative subdivision of British India, was the 
first to enact its juvenile legislation. Shortly afterwards, Bengal and 
Bombay in 1922 and 1924, enacted their respective legislations on 
children. These courts implemented benevolent and paternalistic 
policies under the welfarist mode.15 The Government of India 
legislated the Children Act in 1960, to provide for the trial of 
juvenile delinquents in the Union Territories, as a model to be 
followed by the states, in the enactment of their respective 
legislations concerning juveniles. As per the act, a child was 
defined as a boy under the age of 16 years of age, and a girl, below 
18 years of age.16 Every state had its own children act and 
procedures. The cut-off age provided in each Act lacked 
consistency in terms of definitions as well as in the procedures 
adopted therein. The definition of "child" differed from state to 
state. This prompted the Apex Court to emphasize on the need for 
a uniform Children act. In the case of Sheela Barse v. Union of India,17 
the court observed:  
                                                          
13 In re Gault, 387, U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed 527 (1948); Haley v Ohio 332 US 596, 92 
L. Ed 224 (1948). 
14 Sesha Kethineni & Tricia Klosky, The Impact of Juvenile Justice Reforms in 
India, 44 Int’l Jour. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Crim. 312-25 
(2000) 
15 Maharukh Adenwalla, Juvenile Justice Reforms in India, Childline India 
Foundations (2006). 
16 The Children Act, 1960, Act no. 60 of 1960, § 2(e). 
17 Sheela Barse v. Union of India, 1986 SCALE (2) 230. 




“we would suggest that instead of each state having its own 
children acts different in procedures and content from those 
in other states, it would be desirable if the central 
government initiates the Parliamentary legislation on the 
subject so that there is complete uniformity in regard to the 
various provisions relating to children in the entire territory 
of the country." 
Subsequently, the Parliament enacted the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. 
However, there was a wide gap between the cherished principles 
and the actual practices under the JJ Act, 1986. Therefore, the 
Parliament enacted the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 
2000. The new legislation, Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 has introduced 
a new provision enabling the transfer of children aged between 16-
18 years to children's court, in  cases where in a heinous offence is 
alleged to have been committed by a child. 
3. International Covenants on Juvenile Justice 
The JJ Act, 2015 fails to conform to the International charters on 
Human Rights, which are invoked in its preamble.18The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, commonly known as 
"Declaration of Geneva", the first international instrument on 
children's rights, advocated that child offenders should be 
transformed, not penalized.19 The instrument casts a duty on 
humankind that "the delinquent child must be reclaimed". The 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice, also known as Beijing Rules, categorically spelt out 
the minimum standard to be followed by member states. It states in 
detail, the treatment to be meted out to juveniles without 
distinction of any kind.20 It focuses on rehabilitation aspects of the 
juvenile,21 while also stipulating a variety of dispositions.22 
                                                          
18 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code, Preamble (2015). 
19 Covenant of the League of Nations adopting Geneva Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child on 26 September, 1924. 
20 G.A. Res. 40/33, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (Nov. 29, 1985). 
21Id.  Rules 24.1 and 25.1. 
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The United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter referred to as 
the UNGA) adopted two significant instruments in 1990. The UN 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh 
Guidelines) stressed and recognized in spirit that: 
"part of maturing often includes behavior that does not 
conform to societal norms and that tends to disappear in 
most individuals with the transition to adulthood and avoid 
labelling a youth a deviant or delinquent as this contributes 
to negative patterns of behavior".23 
The UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty (the Havana Rules)is the first international instrument that 
defines a juvenile in terms of age. It recognizes that a juvenile is 
every person under the age of 18.24 The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (hereinafter referred to as CRC), 1989 is an 
international treaty which India has signed as well as ratified. It 
emphasizes on inter alia, best interests of the child and social 
reintegration.25 The reduction of age from 18 to 16 years and 
transfer of a child onto the criminal justice system, is a failure on 
the part of India to observe International conventions. It goes 
against the spirit of the CRC and basic human rights, thereby 
violating international standards, which, paradoxically, find 
mention in the preamble to the JJ Act, 2015.26 
4. Injustices under Section 15 
The most crucial change brought about by the JJ Act, 2015 is that, 
under Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015, a child who has completed or is 
above the age of 16 years can potentially be tried as an adult. Under 
the Act, a child has been defined as a person who has not attained 
                                                                                                                                    
22  Id. Rule 18. 
23 G.A Res. 45/112, United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Juvenile Delinquency (Dec. 14, 1990). 
24 G.A Res. 45/113, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty (Dec. 14, 1990), Rule 11(a). 
25  G.A Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989). 
26 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code, Preamble (2015). 




18 years of age.27 Therefore, there is no change in the definition of 
the child per se. Although the Act has not reduced the age in the 
definition, Section 15 of the Act has reduced the age of a child from 
18 to 16 years for the purpose of treating a child as an adult for 
heinous offences, thus proving to be a glaring and unavoidable 
inconsistency. 
Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015 mandates the JJB to conduct a 
preliminary assessment of children to understand their mental 
status. The JJB may take the help of psycho-social workers, 
psychologists and other experts to ascertain their mental capacity. 
If the Board is satisfied that the child possesses the mental capacity 
to commit such a crime on the basis of the preliminary assessment 
conducted therein, it may send the child to be tried as an adult by 
Children's Court under Section 18(3). This change is relevant, as 
such a transfer entails a protracted process, characterized by an 
extremely adversarial hearing.28 The Children's court, in turn, uses 
Blended sentencing, known also as extended jurisdiction juvenile 
(hereinafter referred to as EJJ), in which the courts can try the 
juvenile either as a child or as an adult. Further, the child is given a 
juvenile sentence to be served at a place of safety, until he becomes 
a major, after which he is transferred to an adult prison.29 The 
blended sentencing rendered by the courts is more punitive in 
nature as it allows children to be sentenced as an adult. This 
convergence eventually erodes the rationale for a separate juvenile 
justice system.30 It is beyond comprehension and somehow 
paradoxical as well, that the same courts established for the 
protection of the child's dignity is now violating it.31 The Apex 
Court has time and again held that the dignity of a child is of 
                                                          
27 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code,  §§ 2(12), (13) (2015). 
28  The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code , § 15 (2015). 
29  The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, INDIA CODE,§19(3). 
30  M. Tonry & M. H. Moore , Youth violence, 24 Chi. Uni. of Chicago Pres. 
189-261 (1998). 
31  The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, INDIA CODE, § 2(20); Manjula Krippendorf v. State (Govt. of 
NCT of Delhi) and Ors, AIR 2017 SC 3457. 
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extreme significance and emphasizes on the sustenance of such 
dignity.32 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(hereinafter referred to as UNCRC), and the Beijing Rules 
advocated that child offenders should be dealt with differently 
from adult offenders. General Comment No.10 specifically reminds 
State Parties of their obligations under the CRC: 
"they have recognized the right of every child alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law 
to be treated in accordance with the provisions of article 40 
of CRC. This means that every person under the age of 18 
years, at the time of the alleged commission of an offence, 
must be treated in accordance with the rules of juvenile 
justice".33 
These conventions and Charters provide a separate treatment for 
youthful offenders through what can be termed as social defense.34 
India was one of the member states and in the year 1992, it had 
ratified the CRC, the world's most heavily ratified human rights 
treaty.35 Despite ratifying it, the Government has overturned this 
well-entrenched practice of treating juvenile offenders different 
from adult offenders. It now allows the JJB’s discretion to exclude 
children above 16 years of age, who have allegedly committed 
heinous offences from the benefit of a benevolent juvenile system. 
Professor Chris Cunneen,36 a leading criminologist, has 
propounded the Labelling Theory. It postulates that juvenile 
                                                          
32  Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590; Suchita Srivastava 
and Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1; Reena 
Banerjee and Anr. v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) and Ors., (2015) 11 SCC 725; 
Mofil Khan and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2015) 1 SCC 67. 
33  General Comment No. 10, Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, para 37, 
38 (2007) 
34  K. Padmaja, Juvenile Delinquency, ICFAI University Press (2007) 
35 Somalia and US Should Ratify UN Child Rights Treaty, Official. 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/10/355732-somalia-and-us-
should-ratify-un-child-rights-treaty-official  
36 Chris Cunneen, Juvenile Justice - An Austalian Perspective, Oxford 
University Press,28-90 (1995). 




delinquency is to be seen as a product of the juvenile's interaction 
with the criminal justice system, as it is responsible for shaping his 
behavior to a great extent. Once a juvenile commits a crime and is 
apprehended by the law enforcement agencies, his treatment as an 
adult in an adversarial criminal justice system such as that of India, 
contributes to his identity as a criminal. This identity is soon 
accepted by and attributed to the offender by both, the society as 
well as the justice system. The societal reaction manifesting in child 
labeling contributes to the child becoming a criminal.37A general 
understanding is that a child is prone to take after the labels 
attributed to him. Consequently, if a child is called bad, that is the 
way the child will identify himself and consequently behave in the 
future.38 The very objective of the Act could have been to preclude 
the interaction of the juvenile with the interface of the adult justice 
system, as labeling of the juvenile contributes to negative patterns 
of behavior. The objective of treating a child as an adult under 
Section 15 is based on the retributive conception of punishment, 
which holds that the best response to a crime is a punishment 
proportional to the offense inflicted by the offender. 
The Apex Court, in Subramanian Swami v. Raju, through the Juvenile 
Justice Board, provided cogent reasons while dismissing the petition 
against reducing the cut-off age from 18 to 16 years.39 In the case of 
Salil Bali v. Union of India,40 the constitutionality of definition of 
child under 18 years was challenged as ultra vires Constitution. The 
Court held as follows. 
"The age of eighteen years has been fixed on account of the 
understanding of the experts in child psychology and 
behavior patterns that till such an age the children in 
conflict with law could still be redeemed and restored to 
mainstream society, instead of becoming hardened 
criminals in future. It is probably better to try and 
reintegrate children with criminal propensities into 
                                                          
37 Justin Ashenfelter, Coming Clean: The Erosion of Juvenile Miranda Rights in 
New York State, 54 NY Lar Rev.(2012). 
38 Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 
10 Oxford Journal (1962). 
39  Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390. 
40  Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 
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mainstream society, rather than to allow them to develop 
into hardened criminals, which does not augur well for the 
future." 41 
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Bill, 2014 was examined 
by the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee, 
which in its 264th report took note of the concerns raised by 
stakeholders, with regard to certain provisions of the legislation 
being ultra vires of the Constitution. The Committee also took 
cognizance of the fact that the most vulnerable section of the 
society, the children, are likely to be adversely affected by the 
legislation.42 It rejected the bill as being unwarranted and 
unconstitutional in the following words:43 
  "[T]he existing Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is not only 
reformative and rehabilitative in nature but also recognizes 
the fact that 16-18 years is an extremely sensitive and critical 
age requiring greater protection. Hence, there is no need to 
subject them to a different or an adult judicial system as it 
will violate Article 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution. We also 
took notice of the Crime in India, 2013 by the National 
Crimes Records Bureau which shows juvenile crimes to be 
1.2 percent of the total crimes committed. It is evident that 
juvenile crime is not significantly increasing so as to 
warrant bringing radical changes in the legislation, which 
could very well be tackled within the existing framework, 
with appropriate infrastructure". 
The Justice Jagdish Sharan Verma Committee constituted in the 
aftermath of the 2013 Delhi gang-rape case, to look into possible 
amendments to criminal law, also recommended against the 
reduction of the age of the juvenile.44 Despite cogent reasons 
proposed by the committees and the Apex Court, the parliament 
                                                          
41 Salil Bali v Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 
42 Two Hundred Sixty Fourth Report The Juvenile Justice (Care and 
Protection of Children) Bill, 2014, Parliament of India, http:// 
www.prsindia.org/ uploads/media/ Juvenile%20Justice/ SC%20 
report-%20Juvenile%20justice.pdf. 
43  Id at para 3.21, Pg. 30. 
44 Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, Gov. of India, 
https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/10772631.  




succumbed to popular demand resonating through media frenzy 
and proceeded with the Act in its present form.  
4.1 Ambiguous Classification in the Legislation 
The JJ Act, 2015 has introduced a three-fold classification of 
offences as petty, serious, and heinous offences. Such a 
classification is ridiculous, not only with respect to JJS but also with 
regard to the criminal justice system.45 Apart from the difference in 
the treatment of a child, the classification serves to determine the 
"crime de jour" for which a child above 16 years and below 18 years 
can potentially be tried as an adult.46 Therefore, it is very important 
to understand the classification made under the act as differential 
treatment of a child is based particularly on this classification. 
Petty offences are those offences for which the maximum 
punishment under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law, is 
imprisonment up to three years.47 For serious offences the 
punishment is imprisonment between three to seven years.48 
Heinous offences include offences for which the minimum 
punishment under the Indian Penal Code or any other law is 
imprisonment for seven years or more. The definition of petty 
offences does not pose any difficulty, as it includes only those 
offences that are punishable with imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding three years. However, the definitions of both serious and 
heinous offences are vaguely worded. There are several offences 
which fall within this ambiguous zone – where the maximum 
punishment is more than seven years and no minimum 
punishment has been mentioned or where the minimum 
punishment is less than seven years. Neither do such offences fall 
                                                          
45 Ved Kumari, Juvenile Justice Act, 2015-Critical Understanding, Indian L. 
Inst. (2017). 
46 Handbook for Advocates working with Children in Conflict with Law in India, 
Nat’l Law School of India University, https:// www.nls.ac.in/ ccl/ 
publications/handbook.pdf. 
47 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code, § 2(45) (2015). 
48 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 02 
of 2016, India Code, § 2(54) (2015). 
Deepak Singh     An Analysis of Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 
13 
 
within the ambit of heinous nor serious offences. They also do not 
fall within the category of petty offences. 
The definition of heinous offences leaves out a considerable 
number of offences. For example, Section 304 of the Indian Penal 
Code, lays out the punishment for culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder. It is prescribed that the punishment may 
extend to ten years. As only the maximum period of imprisonment, 
and no minimum period is mentioned under Section 304, the 
offence will not fall within the category of heinous offence. Another 
such example is the offence of robbery which is punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years…and, if 
the robbery is committed on the highway between sunset and 
sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years. 
Therefore, such offences which are punishable with imprisonment 
not exceeding ten years as in Section 392, (or any other term 
exceeding seven years,) cannot be classified into any category of 
offences envisaged by the JJ Act, 2015. There is ambiguity as to 
whether such offences are to be treated as serious offences (as the 
minimum punishment rendered may or may not be between 3 to 7 
years) or are they to be treated as heinous offences (as no such 
minimum punishment is mentioned under such sections)? There 
are at least 55 offences under the IPC, which do not fall under the 
definition of serious or heinous offences. The description of the 
stipulated category of offences has created unwanted confusion as 
many offences under the Penal Code do not fall within these 
definitions. The adversities are graver if, due to this ambiguity, a 
case is treated to be heinous. In such a case, the child may be 
deprived of the protection of the juvenile justice system. There are 
several offences which fall within this ambiguous zone. 
5. Psychology and Juvenile Delinquency 
Section 15 of the JJ Act, 2015 places an onerous obligation on the 
Board to assess the mental and physical capacity of the child, 
specifically when such a child is above the age of sixteen.  In 
pursuance of this, the Board may take the assistance of experienced 
psycho-social workers, psychologists or other experts for assessing 
the child's mental and physical capacity to commit the crime. 
However, the Act has failed in establishing a universally accepted 




definition, leaving room for ambiguity and consequently, 
arbitrariness. Psychological sciences cannot adequately deconstruct 
this concept in a manner that allows for an accurate and reliable 
assessment. Neither can psychology nor human development 
sciences, precisely identify the chronological age at which such 
capacity exists in its entirety.49 The question of where to draw the 
line between a child and an adult is subjective, and is ultimately 
arbitrary.50 In the case of S v Dyk,51Justice Corbett argued that the 
danger inherent in applying a vague, generalized right and wrong 
test is that, in an instance like this, such a child could well be found 
criminally responsible. Research on the relevance of 
neurodevelopment milestones, in determining the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility has been brought to the fore52 over the last 
15-20 years. Modern technological advances, particularly in 
medical imaging technology, have concluded that adolescent brains 
are not as fully developed as adults until age 25.53 In Stanford v. 
Kentucky,54the US Supreme Court observed that "children, those 
under the age of 18 but even as old as 16 and 17, are not sufficiently 
able to control their impulses, nor to fully understand the 
consequences of their risky behavior." In a 2005 case, Roper v. 
Simmons,55 achild of 17 years was sentenced to death penalty. In an 
attempt to reverse the judgment, the American Psychological 
Association submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to exhibit that at the age of 17 years, the adolescent 
brain is still developing. Based on the scientific evidence 
supporting the amicus brief, the Supreme Court countermanded the 
                                                          
49 Anthony L Pillay & Clive Willows, Assessing the Criminal Capacity of 
Children: a Challenge to the Capacity of Mental Health Professionals, 27 
Journal of Child and Adolescent Mental Health 91-101 (2015). 
50 Robert O. Dawson, The Future of Juvenile Justice: Is It Time to Abolish the 
System?, 81 The Journal of Cri. Law and Criminology 136-155 (1990)  
51 S v Dyk, (1969(1) SA 601(C) 
52 Michael E Lamb & Megam PY Sim, Developmental Factors Affecting 
Children in Legal Contexts, 13 Sage Journals 131-144 (2013). 
53 Supra note 7. 
54  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US 361. 
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death penalty.56 It is suggested that the JJBs send the child for 
preliminary assessment to psychiatric departments of state-run 
hospitals, for ascertaining the mental health of the child. Owing to 
infrastructural and financial deficits which plague these hospitals, 
it can reasonably be concluded that such departments may not be 
suitable to assess the requisite criteria. A psychologist is unable to 
satisfy the requirement under Section 15(1) of JJ Act, 2015 as they 
are skilled to identify mental illness/disorders, and not the ‘mental 
or physical capacity’ of the child, which even psychiatric/psycho-
social workers cannot do.57 The process of assessment of a child, 
especially in this setting, is a complex task, time consuming and 
costly to be applied to each child.58 The JJ Act, 2015 is willfully 
blind to neuro developmental sciences, social sciences, and 
foundational religious teachings about human nature. It is 
unfortunate that in spite of abundance of research in this field, the 
legislature, riding on the emotions of erroneous public opinion 
brought into effect the JJ Act, 2015. 
6. Juvenile Justice and the Constitution 
The Preamble of the JJ Act, 2015 refers to Articles 15(3), 39(e) and 
(f), 45 and 47 of the Constitution. It states that such Articles cast an 
obligation "on the State to ensure that all the needs of children are 
met and that their basic human rights are protected".59 The transfer 
system of a child to adult criminal system under the Act, violates 
the right to equality under the Constitution. Article 14 prescribes 
equality before law, but the fact remains that all are not equal by 
nature, circumstances, attainment, and hence a mechanical equality 
before the law results in injustice.60 The Supreme Court has 
underlined this principle thus:  
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"Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among 
equals: its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against 
discrimination. It means that equals should be treated alike; 
it does not mean that 'unequals ought to be treated equally'. 
Persons who are in the like circumstances should be treated 
equally. On the other hand, where persons or groups of 
persons are not situated equally, to treat them as equals 
would itself be violative of Article 14 as this would result in 
inequality".61 
Children and adults being on an unequal footing with respect to 
their psychological development, ought not to be treated alike. 
Subjecting children to the same criminal justice system as adults, is 
premised on the flawed assumption that children and adults can be 
held to the same standard of culpability and that children are 
capable of participating in legal proceedings in a like manner.62 
When one expects the same level of psychological understanding 
and behavior as adults from children, one is guilty of  treating 
unequals as equals and as a consequence, violating Article 14. The 
most important way in which a child is different from an adult is 
that he/she is in the process of becoming an adult - a state that has 
been described as semiautonomous.63 Therefore, holding them to 
the same standards of culpability as adults, is not appropriate. 
Further Article 15(3) of the Constitution mandates that states make 
special provisions in favor of children, not against them.64 The state 
has a Constitutional obligation to safeguard their interests and 
welfare in the real sense, not by doing them a favor, as  charity.65 
                                                          
61  RK Garg v Union Of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138.  
62  Supra note 49.  
63 Franklin E. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of Adolescene, 
MAcmillan Publishing Co. New York, (1985)  
64 Sri Mahadeb Jiew and Anr. v. Dr. B.B Sen, AIR 1951 Cal 563; 
Independent Thought v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4904. 
65 Sampurna Behura v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2018) 4 SCC 433. 
Deepak Singh     An Analysis of Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 
17 
 
7. Avenues for Change: Possible Solutions 
‘Hard Cases make bad law,’ is an old adage which dates back to 
1837. It was an observation made by Justice Robert Rolf in the case 
of Winterbottom v Wright in 1842: 
"This is one of those unfortunate cases...in which, it is, no 
doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy 
but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. 
Hard cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to 
introduce bad law".66 
The observation made by Judge Robert Rolf, has sound 
implications. Laws should be made for the benefit of the general 
population. The laws enacted should reflect average circumstances 
and should not be based on extreme cases, as they form a poor 
basis for the enactment of laws. The Nirbhaya case, where a 
medical student was brutally gang raped is one such bad example. 
The juvenile offender who prompted the nation-wide debate about 
the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the JJ Act, was termed as the 
most brutal amongst all offenders. India has taken a step-backward 
by introducing JJ Act, 2015 on the basis of one bad case of involving 
a barbaric gang-rape in which one of the juvenile offenders was just 
a few months short of attaining majority.  
The government also jettisoned its responsibility to take into 
account the experience of countries which have adopted the 
practice of transfer of children to the adult criminal justice system. 
These countries have had higher rates of recidivism.67 The Court in 
Madrid v. Gomez,68 observed that the modern prison life may press 
the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically 
tolerate. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J, adult prisons are like 
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"animal farms".69 The future of child offenders in adult prisons, 
presents a bleak picture. Owing to such a system, the juveniles are 
at a greater risk of committing suicide and suffering from sexual 
and physical abuse meted out to them by older inmates. A direct 
causal link can be drawn to the effects of the brutalization and the 
harms suffered by juveniles.70 The culture and environment in 
prison, fosters behavior in juveniles that increases their chance of 
recidivism. They are also exposed to techniques which they can 
utilize, in order to indulge in illegal activities, on their return to the 
society.71 The author suggests that rehabilitation plays a very 
crucial role in the Juvenile justice system. Rehabilitating a juvenile, 
who has committed an offence, itself can have a deterrent value, 
because successful rehabilitation results in specific deterrence. 
8. A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile Justice Systems  
The problem of juvenile delinquency is not confined to a particular 
country. It is a global phenomenon. However, the age at which a 
person is considered a juvenile, differs significantly from country to 
country, and so do the approaches to tackle juvenile delinquency.72 
In this section, the author will examine how other countries in 
different parts of the world are addressing  juvenile delinquency. 
8.1 Uganda’s Juvenile Justice System  
Uganda ratified the UNCRC in 1990. In 1996, Uganda enacted its 
own juvenile legislation. The legislation reflects the commitment of 
Uganda, a developing country with scant resources, to import 
children's rights into local laws, as enshrined in the CRC. This is 
evident in the measures taken by the Ugandan government to place 
its law in conformity with the CRC, delivering of justice to children, 
strengthening child protection structures and helping to build a 
                                                          
69  Satto v. State of UP, (1979) 2 SCC 628. 
70 William C. Bailey, Deterrence, brutalization, and the death penalty: Another 
examination of Oklahoma's return to capital punishment, 36 Criminology 
711-33 (1998). 
71 Richard E. Redding, Adult punishment for Juvenile offenders: Does it reduce 
crime? 47 (Illanova Uni. School of Law Working Paper Series. 1-37 
(2006). 
72 Supra note 38.  
Deepak Singh     An Analysis of Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 
19 
 
protective environment for children.73 Uganda has adopted a child-
centric approach in its Constitution. Article 34(6) of the 
Constitution of Uganda provides for separate treatment of child 
offenders and further entailed that a child offender shall not be 
detained with adults.74 The commitment to put into effect the 
Constitutional provision on children, is reflected in Section 4 of the 
Children's Act which gives the welfare of the child top-most 
priority.75 The maximum punishment which a Family and Children 
court (FCC) can inflict cannot be more than three years in case of an 
offence punishable by death and three months in case of any other 
offence.76 Uganda carried out an amendment in its Children's Act 
in 2016. As per the new amended Act, the country has also 
specifically focused on the core issues which lead to the juvenile 
offences. Section 6 of the Act emphasizes on parental responsibility 
to provide basic amenities such as education, immunization, diet, 
clothing, and medical attention and so on.77 The principle of 
diversion has been paid much attention by Uganda, where a child 
alleged to have committed a crime is let off at the time of 
apprehension, with a mere warning, without resorting to formal 
court proceedings.78 In the Republic of Uganda v. O.D (a juvenile),79 
the High Court of Uganda held that the statute conceives the 
detention of a child as a serious measure, which must be resorted to 
only as a last resort. It must be reserved for the worst cases.80 
8.2 The South African Perspective 
The South African Republic ratified the CRC in 1995. After having 
ratified the CRC, it has adopted a sustainable juvenile legislation 
after much contemplation. The South African juvenile system has 
been crafted in a manner that the majority of children will be dealt 
with outside the criminal justice system, without recourse to the 
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formal court system. Section 28(2) of the Constitution of South 
Africa gives due regard to the best interests of the child, when 
dealing with matters involving them. It also enumerates the right of 
the child to be kept separately from adult offenders.81 The Child 
Justice Act passed in 2008, in pursuance to the constitutional 
mandate, promotes the ethos of ubuntu,82(the concept of common 
humanity)thus preventing children from being tried in the 
adversarial court system. This is achieved by resorting to 
mechanisms which are more suitable to the interest of the child and 
in accordance with the Constitution of South Africa, including the 
use of diversion.83 In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v. 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Ors.84the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that "Courts are bound to 
give effect to the provision of Section 28(2) in matters which 
involve children and are obliged to give consideration to the rights 
and best interests of the child." 
8.3 Juvenile Justice in France 
The French Juvenile system resorts to educative solutions, rather 
than to impose punitive measures. This has been France's choice for 
over 60 years, since the Order of 2 February 1945.85 Article 8 of the 
Order, reflects the desire of the society to ensure the best possible 
future for its children, by reintegrating them into the community, 
by dealing with the core issues such as the moral status of their 
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family, the educative environment, the conditions in which they 
have been brought up, rather than relying on preventive measures 
to ensure their rights.86 France does not have the same system of 
transferring juveniles to adult criminal courts as India. In an 
interview with Judge Catherine Samet, Investigative Judge, 
Tribunal de Grand Instance, in Nanterre Prefecture (suburb of 
Paris), the Judge emphasized on the Humanist approach towards 
Juvenile offenders as the cornerstone of the French Juvenile Justice 
System.87 The whole programme is aimed at educating juveniles as 
an alternative to imprisonment. This helps in preventing 
delinquency in its nascent stage itself, at the school and family 
level. Consequently, positive results are visible in France. 
9. Ideas India can Adopt 
An analysis of how other countries are tackling juvenile 
delinquency with a child-centric approach, offers valuable lessons 
for India. First, without exception, in all the countries reviewed 
herein, there is a tendency to tackle the core issues which lead to 
juvenile delinquency such as moral status of family, child's 
education et cetera to prevent delinquency at its nascent stage. 
Second, juvenile legislations in all the aforementioned countries 
have been balanced in such a way, so as to secure the best interests 
of the child, without taking recourse to the formal legal system. The 
principle of diversion has also been paid much attention. Third, 
fundamental to all these countries is the separate treatment of a 
child in a system distinct from the adult criminal justice system. 
The lesson for India is that Criminal conduct and its influence on 
society depends on the treatment juveniles receive today.88 
Preventing today's juvenile offenders from engaging in future 
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criminal activity is a more realistic and humane goal than forfeiting 
the future of an entire segment of the population.89 
10. Conclusion 
The JJ Act, 2015, by introducing the provision of transfer has taken 
a step backward, while defeating the sui generis status of a child. 
The object of the JJ Act, 2015, as it presently stands, leans more 
towards managing juvenile offenders than rehabilitating them. The 
committee examining the Juvenile Justice bill, 2014 was appraised 
by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, regarding the 
various problems in the existing JJ Act, 2000. These problems 
ranged from a delay in inquiries, lack of clarity pertaining to roles, 
functions, responsibilities, accountability of JJBs and also reports 
repeated instances of abuse of children in the institution. Instead of 
strengthening the Act of 2000, which was more appreciative of the 
developmental needs of the child, the government rushed to enact 
a whole new piece of legislation, which is a retrograde step likely to 
serve no purpose.90 It is also found that children below the age of 
18 are not likely to exhibit sufficient competence in either juvenile 
or criminal courts. Several instances of a child being a defendant in 
an adversarial court proceeding, hampers the chance of securing 
justice, as juveniles are less likely to communicate effectively and 
trust their lawyers, both being indispensable in establishing a legal 
defense. It has changed the approach of law towards children in the 
direction of a law-driven system and away from treatment-driven 
system. The government has passed the JJ Act, 2015, bypassing the 
core issues pertaining to the rights of the child. The steps 
undertaken by the government for the welfare of the child has paid 
less attention to the core issues which lead to juvenile delinquency.  
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As it has already been observed, criminal behavior is caused by 
unwholesome environmental determinism of a child.91 The current 
emphasis of the law should shift "from assessing the social harm 
that the offender has done to assessing the social needs of the 
offender. According to Locke, education is the only way to "[set] 
the mind right " and help in finding a solution for juvenile 
delinquency.92 Creating a system that focuses on early intervention 
is extremely important. The focus should lie in strengthening the 
institutions of education and family. These can be expensive, but 
much economical if the bigger picture is taken into account. Taking 
steps in this regard will most likely be practically useful to invest in 
the child’s overall development, rather than labelling them as 
unredeemable.  
As the law has already been passed, the author suggests that trying 
juveniles as adults should be rare and applied for only the most 
severe, violent crimes. Model rules should be enacted to try a 
juvenile as an adult, only in the rarest of the rare cases. Adult 
prisons do not encourage positive change in offenders nor does it 
focus on rehabilitation aspects. Instead, it creates an environment 
that encourages further criminal activity. The affirmative steps the 
system must take to rehabilitate the offender must necessarily focus 
on not causing more harm. This would facilitate the child into 
becoming a law-abiding citizen.  
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